Mammalian intelligence is based on repurposing spatial mapping circuitry but that’s not consciousness itself, that is, the Miller Number: 7±2 things we can keep in conscious at the same time. That sense of time of space has a very specific quality to its qualias, they’re all, well, spacious. That thing as “just the room, no map in it” is also part of the Buddhist Jhanas (“boundless empty space”), but there’s plenty of stuff going on in the mind that isn’t part of that – say, the pure impression of “bright” when your SO dares open the window blinds does not have a navigational “bright from the window which is in that direction” to it, that’s an additional layer, a where, on top of the primitive what.
My best inference is that the function of consciousness is to flexibly make connections between different parts of the whole, and that on the level of learning / writing memory instead of automatic response: It is, in fact, possible to avoid running into a lamppost without being conscious of it, been there, done that, the let’s call it motor cortex first acting and then making me conscious, as if to say “have I been a good boy?”. That is it’s actually a quite passive process, being thrown left and right by systems wanting to do some connection, and shouldn’t be equated with will at all.
I would argue part of you (body and eye consciousness) were quite conscious of the lamppost even if the consciousness mind was paying more attention to something else.
That’s semantics. My major objection to that kind of definition is that it knows no bound and distinction: Where do you stop assuming consciousness? Electrons are reacting to, influencing, and interacting with other electrons, is that also a form of consciousness? One could say so, but then everything is conscious which is the same thing as saying as nothing is conscious because without anything to delineate, terms are meaningless. I prefer language such as that what you call “body and eye consciousness” has agentive properties, that it can learn, that it generally wants to cooperate and be of service to the whole, such things. Lumping it up with consciousness risks confusing interpretations of messages of the thing (which is all we’re ever conscious of) for the thing itself.
guarding against distractions away from what is happening now, is mindfulness.
What was happening then is that I was using the way from home to the supermarket to think about code, with ample trust in mind so that I did not fear the lamppost. What good would have keeping my consciousness on the external world have done? The body/eye did not need integrative oversight, while my modelling mind very much could use a helping hand. Imposing it on the former and denying it to the latter would’ve been inflicting violence on myself.
Be careful to not moralise around “distraction”. Bluntly said when your teacher chided you for day-dreaming you probably weren’t distracted you were thinking about something more pertinent to your immediate development than calculus. Where discipline in directing consciousness comes into play is keeping your mind free from neurosis, within parameters in which you use your faculties according to their nature, as well as self-conditioning, e.g. if you’re addicted to potato chips, make sure that a) you don’t deny yourself potato chips and b) eat. every. potato. chip. with. full. consciousness. That’s to connect the act of eating up those chips to all the negative opinions you have about your behaviour, instead of it being only connected to something maladaptive. Scientifically proven and neurologically explained that and how that works, btw. In that sense “distraction” is “false, incomplete, sense of comfort”.
I think it would be inaccurate because not all matter has six sense bases and the storehouse is itself an aggregate.
The first five are basically one, in the sense that a blind or deaf person is not fundamentally less of a human than the rest of us. The model also misses some stuff, e.g. mere touch doesn’t include proprioception or sense of balance and if you read it as if it did (“body sense”) then why distinguish touch from e.g. sense of taste. Seventh I’d say is a subsystem (and so pervasive that the Stoics allow for both preferred and unpreferred indifferents – yes you can prefer pudding over gruel or the other way round just don’t think it’s a virtue), eighth is a stage of development, what you get when everything aligns well. The impression of a well-lubed machine.
I understand your objections to assumptions matter could be conscious based on this model. I think it would be inaccurate because not all matter has six sense bases and the storehouse is itself an aggregate.
I generally have no real idea of where to put the line. This stuff here might help, anything less than a T3 system can’t have experience of mind (they can’t learn to learn, which requires feeding back information about the changes in mind (for lack of better term) into the mind), OTOH that doesn’t mean that all T3 systems are actually integrating different sources, or balancing them: If you only ever were conscious of one aspect, there could be no conflict or interaction with another aspect, and thus consciousness would serve no role (and not evolve in the first place). It’s a matter of a required number of subsystems needing coordinating, and that coordinating itself having a necessary level of adaptiveness, be T3. Also I can authoritatively say that the human mind is not made to think about that kind of stuff. It’s all maps and models, direct knowledge fails I’m not sure the territory can even understand the question. Look, a squirrel!
In principle subsystems that aren’t awareness can also be T3 systems, I suspect that at least from the motor cortex, mine does seem to have gotten more effective at learning from moment to moment, meaning it learned how to learn better and that’s T3. At least I think it’s not just me learning to not micro-manage it as much, it’s very hard to be sure about any of this, too many intersecting possibilities.
From the cybernetic/information theory side we don’t really know how these kinds of systems work in the first place, we’re barely getting started understanding T2 systems. All the AI tech we have is basically ways to breed fruit flies to fly left or right when seeing certain patterns, with enough computing power thrown at it to look impressive. We already had that kind of tech in the 50s (first implementations 54 for genetic algorithms, 57 for the perceptron), of course less impressive.
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Mammalian intelligence is based on repurposing spatial mapping circuitry but that’s not consciousness itself, that is, the Miller Number: 7±2 things we can keep in conscious at the same time. That sense of time of space has a very specific quality to its qualias, they’re all, well, spacious. That thing as “just the room, no map in it” is also part of the Buddhist Jhanas (“boundless empty space”), but there’s plenty of stuff going on in the mind that isn’t part of that – say, the pure impression of “bright” when your SO dares open the window blinds does not have a navigational “bright from the window which is in that direction” to it, that’s an additional layer, a where, on top of the primitive what.
My best inference is that the function of consciousness is to flexibly make connections between different parts of the whole, and that on the level of learning / writing memory instead of automatic response: It is, in fact, possible to avoid running into a lamppost without being conscious of it, been there, done that, the let’s call it motor cortex first acting and then making me conscious, as if to say “have I been a good boy?”. That is it’s actually a quite passive process, being thrown left and right by systems wanting to do some connection, and shouldn’t be equated with will at all.
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That’s semantics. My major objection to that kind of definition is that it knows no bound and distinction: Where do you stop assuming consciousness? Electrons are reacting to, influencing, and interacting with other electrons, is that also a form of consciousness? One could say so, but then everything is conscious which is the same thing as saying as nothing is conscious because without anything to delineate, terms are meaningless. I prefer language such as that what you call “body and eye consciousness” has agentive properties, that it can learn, that it generally wants to cooperate and be of service to the whole, such things. Lumping it up with consciousness risks confusing interpretations of messages of the thing (which is all we’re ever conscious of) for the thing itself.
What was happening then is that I was using the way from home to the supermarket to think about code, with ample trust in mind so that I did not fear the lamppost. What good would have keeping my consciousness on the external world have done? The body/eye did not need integrative oversight, while my modelling mind very much could use a helping hand. Imposing it on the former and denying it to the latter would’ve been inflicting violence on myself.
Be careful to not moralise around “distraction”. Bluntly said when your teacher chided you for day-dreaming you probably weren’t distracted you were thinking about something more pertinent to your immediate development than calculus. Where discipline in directing consciousness comes into play is keeping your mind free from neurosis, within parameters in which you use your faculties according to their nature, as well as self-conditioning, e.g. if you’re addicted to potato chips, make sure that a) you don’t deny yourself potato chips and b) eat. every. potato. chip. with. full. consciousness. That’s to connect the act of eating up those chips to all the negative opinions you have about your behaviour, instead of it being only connected to something maladaptive. Scientifically proven and neurologically explained that and how that works, btw. In that sense “distraction” is “false, incomplete, sense of comfort”.
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The first five are basically one, in the sense that a blind or deaf person is not fundamentally less of a human than the rest of us. The model also misses some stuff, e.g. mere touch doesn’t include proprioception or sense of balance and if you read it as if it did (“body sense”) then why distinguish touch from e.g. sense of taste. Seventh I’d say is a subsystem (and so pervasive that the Stoics allow for both preferred and unpreferred indifferents – yes you can prefer pudding over gruel or the other way round just don’t think it’s a virtue), eighth is a stage of development, what you get when everything aligns well. The impression of a well-lubed machine.
I generally have no real idea of where to put the line. This stuff here might help, anything less than a T3 system can’t have experience of mind (they can’t learn to learn, which requires feeding back information about the changes in mind (for lack of better term) into the mind), OTOH that doesn’t mean that all T3 systems are actually integrating different sources, or balancing them: If you only ever were conscious of one aspect, there could be no conflict or interaction with another aspect, and thus consciousness would serve no role (and not evolve in the first place). It’s a matter of a required number of subsystems needing coordinating, and that coordinating itself having a necessary level of adaptiveness, be T3. Also I can authoritatively say that the human mind is not made to think about that kind of stuff. It’s all maps and models, direct knowledge fails I’m not sure the territory can even understand the question. Look, a squirrel!
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In principle subsystems that aren’t awareness can also be T3 systems, I suspect that at least from the motor cortex, mine does seem to have gotten more effective at learning from moment to moment, meaning it learned how to learn better and that’s T3. At least I think it’s not just me learning to not micro-manage it as much, it’s very hard to be sure about any of this, too many intersecting possibilities.
From the cybernetic/information theory side we don’t really know how these kinds of systems work in the first place, we’re barely getting started understanding T2 systems. All the AI tech we have is basically ways to breed fruit flies to fly left or right when seeing certain patterns, with enough computing power thrown at it to look impressive. We already had that kind of tech in the 50s (first implementations 54 for genetic algorithms, 57 for the perceptron), of course less impressive.
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deleted by creator